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Guest Editorial
The ‘‘Nuclearization’’ of Biology Is a Threat to Health
and Security
David R. Franz, Susan A. Ehrlich, Arturo Casadevall, Michael J. Imperiale, and Paul S. Keim
Every technology, from fire to gunpowder to avia-tion, has been used by humans largely for good but also
for harm. But the capabilities of an individual or group to
do great harm have increased markedly in the past 50 years.
In the mid-20th century, we developed nuclear weapons,
but these have remained in the hands of nation-states be-
cause it would be extraordinarily difficult for even a tech-
nically competent group of individuals to gain access to the
singular ingredients—highly enriched uranium or re-
processed plutonium—and the technology to develop a
nuclear weapon and thus cause incalculable harm and mass
death. To date we have controlled the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons by safeguarding the rare elements needed to
produce them and by carefully screening scientists and
technicians for their physical and mental health. Today,
only a few nation-states have the bomb, and there have been
zero accidental or terrorist detonations.
More recently, our understanding of biology and the
means to utilize it have improved greatly. Indeed, we’ve
seen a revolution in recombinant DNA technology, syn-
thetic genomics, nanotechnology, and de novo synthesis of
microbes, among many examples. These powerful tools and
information are now found in secondary schools around the
globe and in homes of do-it-yourself genetic engineers.
Proliferation of the biotechnologies is essentially complete.
In 1996, one ‘‘outlier biologist’’ attempted to acquire a
common, but potentially lethal, pathogenic microbe from
the American Type Culture Collection. In response,
alarmed legislators called for an official list of ‘‘dangerous
pathogens’’ and the registration of laboratories that ex-
changed those pathogens. As a result, in 1997, the ‘‘nuclear
model’’ was applied to biology for the first time. Years later,
a series of ‘‘anthrax letters’’ killed 5 individuals, frightened
tens of thousands of people, and precipitated a significant
degree of government and economic disorder, prompting
scientists to increasingly engage in discussions of ‘‘dual-use
biology’’—that is, biology that could be used for malevo-
lent as well as benevolent purposes. Then, on July 28, 2008,
a respected senior scientist at Ft. Detrick, Maryland,
committed suicide just before the Department of Justice
was to seek an indictment charging him with crimes having
to do with the anthrax letters.
Now, the U.S. government is once again looking to the
nuclear model to further regulate biology. It is worth
pausing to reflect whether this is a wise strategy, given the
dichotomy between the nuclear and biological threats. The
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first involves rare materials and costly, complicated science
and is practically restricted to nation-states; the second
involves agents that can be inexpensively and readily ob-
tained and science not restricted to nation-states but
available to rogue individuals and organizations. These
fundamental differences between biological and nuclear
weapons strongly suggest that nuclear counterproliferation
and prevention strategies are not applicable to biology. We
need to think of alternative security models.
National committees are pondering the solution to the
‘‘insider threat,’’ described as our greatest menace in the
2008 report of the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.
As the revolution in biology—and capabilities to do good
or harm with its tools and knowledge—roars around the
globe, our legislators seemingly are viewing with increasing
suspicion all scientists who work with a very short and
specific list of ‘‘dangerous’’ microbes.
Despite this assault, much of the scientific community is
on the sidelines. Either this controversy hasn’t yet had an
impact on their research on other infectious disease–causing
agents, synthetic genomics, nanotechnology, or studies of
the human immune system, or they have chosen less-
controversial areas of research. But the regulation of re-
sponsible scientists and legitimate technologies and microbes
with the goal of eliminating a threat that may involve 1
individual among 10 million humans is tricky business. We
cannot really know if we’ve over-regulated to the detriment of
science in the U.S. because it is impossible to estimate the cost
of research that is not done. However, by over-regulating life
sciences research, the U.S. paradoxically could make itself
more vulnerable. We must carefully consider the real risks of
legitimate science and the real costs of regulation. Otherwise,
there is no doubt that the sustained valuable discoveries of
our life sciences enterprise will suffer.
Life sciences research offers all of us better health and
security. Biological science provides our primary, con-
tinuing defense against diseases, natural or man-made, with
knowledge that can be translated into effective counter-
measures such as vaccines and new therapies. Any regula-
tion that unnecessarily hinders this research is a real and
unnecessary threat to our health, our economy, and our
national security. It thus is critical that the entire bioscience
community join the discussion with legislators and the
public now—before we start down a regulatory slippery
slope that could harm science in the U.S. forever.
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